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SLAVERY, FREE BLACKS AND CITIZENSHIP
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.*
The Constitution and the Sectional Conflict
Rutgers University School of Law-Camden
Camden, New Jersey, Aprill2, 2011
"Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to take
you in."
-Robert Frost, The Death ofthe Hired Man (1915)
"Membership has its privileges."
-American Express advertisement
"In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American."
-Justice Scalia, concurring, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 239 (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION

The most nettlesome issue in American constitutional law in the days
surrounding the Civil War, before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
may have been how to address the status of native-born free blacks. The core
issue was whether free blacks should be treated as free people who should be
fully included in the polity or as the equivalent of free slaves who should not
be fully included in the polity. The liberty and equality embodied in the
Constitution suggest that free people who have aligned themselves with the
American republic should be eligible to become citizens and members of the
American polity. However, that was not necessarily true of free blacks in the

.
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days preceding the Civil War. That may not be surprising to some
considering that the Constitution tolerated race-based slavery. A society that
accepted slavery may have been unwilling to guarantee the acceptance of
free people who bore the racial mark of slavery. However, American society
was bound to address those issues again during the Civil War and its
aftermath.
This brief essay focuses on whether and how the historical exclusion and
subsequent inclusion of free blacks in the American polity reflects the
substance of American citizenship. It considers what the formal exclusion of
free blacks as citizens before the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments
says about American citizenship and what the formal inclusion of free blacks
as citizens through the Reconstruction Amendments says about the nature of
American citizenship. The essay is organized as follows. Part I of the essay
explores citizenship and membership by discussing belonging-based
citizenship and rights-based citizenship. Part II describes how American and
African American citizenship were constructed prior to the passage of the
Reconstruction Amendments. Part III notes a few cases to explain how the
Reconstruction Amendment's jurisprudence has developed in the wake of
Dred Scott v. Sandford' and possibly led to a tilt toward a rights-based
citizenship rather than a somewhat more robust belonging-based citizenship.
II. CITIZENSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP

A. Rights and Belonging
The content of American citizenship is elusive. Citizenship suggests
being an equal member and full participant in a nation or polity. 2 However,
I. 60 u.s. 393 (1857).
2. This has helped define citizenship for a long time. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.
162, 165-66 (1875) (noting that citizenship is membership in a nation); DAVID J. BREWER,
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 12 (1905) (viewing citizenship and membership in a nation or tribe as
interchangeable); BERNARD P. DAUENHAUER, CITIZENSHIP IN A FRAGILE WORLD I (1996)
(linking citizenship and community membership); LUELLA GETTYS, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP
IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1934) ("Citizenship, then, is membership in a nation or state[.]");
DORA KOSTAKOPOULOU, THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF CITIZENSHIP I (2008) ("Citizenship,
which may be defined as equal membership of a political community from which enforceable
rights and obligations, benefits and resources, participatory practices and a sense of identity
flow, affects everyone."); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 4 (1991) ("Citizenship
as nationality is the legal recognition, both domestic and international, that a person is a
member, native-born or naturalized, of a state."); JOHN S. WISE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP 3 ( 1905) ("[T]he term citizen, as it is commonly understood, implies membership
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citizenship and membership are fluid concepts. 3 They can be fuzzy concepts
because they can be conceptualized in many different ways. 4 Both entail
rights and responsibilities that accompany being a part of an organization or
entity. Citizenship and membership may be structured merely as a formal set
of rights owed to the member by an organization accompanied by a formal
set of obligations owed by the member to the organization. 5 This rightsbased membership may be the least robust, but most definitive vision of
citizenship and membership. Conversely, membership may be based on the
more general notion of belonging to the organization in which one has
membership. 6 Belonging may bring formal rights and obligations. However,
it may also include fuzzy rights and fuzzy obligations to the other members
in the organization and to the organization itselC That is, citizenship and
membership can be thought to define a relationship in which the citizen
belongs to the community and is treated colloquially as "one of us." This
vision of membership is arguably more robust than the mere rights-andof a political body in which the individual enjoys popular liberty to a greater or less degree. It
does not necessarily follow from this definition, that the grade or quality or privileges of
citizenship must be identical in all citizens, even in republican governments.").
3.
See Pauline Maier, Nationhood and Citizenship: What Difference Did the American
Revolution Make?, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP 45-47 (1996) ("[l)n exploring that subject,
it is important to understand that the words 'nation' and 'citizen' have changed in meaning
over time."); NOELLE MCAFEE, HABERMAS, I<RJSTEVA, & CITIZENSHIP 13 (2000) (discussing
how the meaning of citizen has changed over time); SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 9 ("I also want
to remind political theorists that citizenship is not a notion that can be discussed intelligibly in
a static and empty social space .... Citizenship has changed over the years[.]").
4. Citizenship subsumes many components that can be structured in various ways. See
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN 20 (2006) ("Thus, status, rights, political
engagement, and identity together define the contours of our contemporary understandings of
citizenship as membership.").
5. See DAUENHAUER, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that citizenship "confers entitlements
and immunities and imposes obligations"); McAFEE, supra note 3, at 13 (noting that rights
and obligations attend citizenship).
6. I borrow the notion of belonging from Kenneth Karst. See generally KENNETH L.
KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA (I 989). Others have similarly considered the notion of
belonging. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 945, 946 (2005) ("The focus of this essay is on
what Professor Denise Morgan and I call 'Rights of Belonging,' those rights that promote an
inclusive vision of who belongs to the national community and that facilitate equal
membership in that community.").
7. See Noah M.J. Pickus, "Hearken Not to the Unnatural Voice": Pub/ius and the
Artifice of Attachment, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP 63 (I 996) ("Membership in the
American polity is not, ·however, solely a matter of formal textual provisions governing
eligibility and rights. United State citizenship also encompasses a notion of belonging to a
political community.").
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obligations vision of membership, but is less defined. 8 Rather than providing
a determinate way to define citizenship, using membership as a lens provides
a range of possible definitions of citizenship. The different
conceptualizations of citizenship can lead to very different citizenship
experiences for various citizens and can affect the type of society that is
created.
A rights-and-obligations-based vision of citizenship may or may not be a
particularly fulfilling one, though it may be a quite definitive version of
citizenship. Legal rights and obligations may be explicitly defined and one
may be a good citizen merely by abiding by the citizenship "contract." 9
However, the relationship between citizen and community and among
citizens may become an arm's length relationship that is viewed not as a
mutually reinforcing relationship, but as an relationship of convenience.
Indeed, entry and exit from the relationship may be based purely on the
tangible value of the association. For example, the confederate states were
members of the Union, but believed that voluntary exit from the Union was
or should have been allowed once the value of the relationship had
diminished. 10
A belonging-based citizenship may be indefinite, but quite fulfilling. 11
Citizens will have rights and obligations under this construction of
citizenship. However, the nature of belonging may trigger somewhat
uncertain moral rights and obligations in addition to reasonably clear legal
rights and obligations that flow from formal citizenship. 12 Bonds of
belonging may tend to create mutually reinforcing and beneficial
8. See Nathan Glazer, Reflections on Citizenship and Diversity, in DIVERSITY AND
CITIZENSHIP 85, 86 (1996) ("[S]omething more seems to be needed, aside from native birth,
no accent, and presumed American citizenship, to be considered by a stranger a full American.
The formal and informal indications of full citizenship and membership are insufficient.").
9. See Daniel Kanstroom, Alien Litigation As Polity-Participation: The Positive Power
of a "Voteless Class Of Litigants", 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 399, 407 (2012) (suggesting
that citizenship is narrower than general membership in a polity, and may be constructed
around rights and obligations); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Mission Dissonance in the TANF
Program: Of Work. Self-Sufficiency, Reciprocity, and the Work Participation Rate, 6 HARV. L.
& PoL'Y REV. 369, 375 (20 12) (discussing a rights and obligations vision of citizenship).
10. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 267 (1995) (discussing secession of
southern states prior to Civil War); EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE NATION 18611865, at 41-43(1979) (discussing secession).
I I. Belonging can spur society-enhancing behavior. See Pickus, supra note 7, at 64
("Citizens have to regard belonging as itself important if talk of civic virtue is to find an
attentive audience.").
12. See BREWER, supra note 2, at 6---11 (noting that the law does not catalog or enforce
all of the moral duties and obligations that parties owe to one another in a relationship).
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relationships between and among the citizen, fellow citizens and the
community. This belonging-based citizenship is fluid and unclear, but may
be more robust from the citizen's perspective than the rights-based version of
citizenship. It is a conception of citizenship that may firmly tie the citizen to
the community and the community to the citizen. The essence of belongingbased citizenship may not be found explicitly in the Constitution or statutes,
but instead may be written on the hearts and in the minds of the community's
citizens or members. 13
Though citizenship and membership can be defined as either rightsbased or belonging-based, any type of membership may include aspects of
both. Indeed, the four examples of membership noted below illustrate this
point. Each type of membership has a rights-based element and a belongingbased element, though each element has a somewhat different prominence in
each type of membership. 14
B. Illustrations of Membership
1. Faculty Membership
For many, faculty membership is a prized possession. After tenure,
faculty membership comes with the security and enhanced freedom to pursue
one's academic work. However, faculty membership can be defined largely
as employment. Being a faculty member comes with certain rights against
one's school and certain obligations owed primarily to the institution itself
rather than directly to other members of the institution. Certainly, there may
be varying fuzzy rights-often tied to seniority-that can be exercised, such
as a right to a larger office or to a preferred schedule of classes. In addition,
more serious but still fuzzy obligations may be owed to fellow members of
the faculty, such as the obligation to mentor junior faculty members or to
read their draft articles. Yet more fuzzy obligations may be owed to students,
including the obligation to write letters of recommendation. The rights and
13. See Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REv. 431,432-33 (2006)
The ideal of the autonomous individual capable of meaningful choice and informed
decision making is a core operative concept in modern constitutional law, central to
contemporary accounts of individual liberty and democratic self-government. ... The
psychological skills of citizenship so defined encompass both heart and mind: basic
cognitive abilities as well as the integrated psychological capacities for personal selfreflection and emotional self-mastery.
!d.
14. For an old and fascinating discussion of obligations owed to parties in different
relationships, see BREWER, supra note 2, at 3-8.
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obligations are fuzzy. However, they relate to duties thought to be owed by a
faculty member. 15
The essence of faculty membership, at least from an employment
perspective, arguably is an arm's length relationship that can be temporary or
longstanding at the option of the parties to the relationship. Certainly, the
relationship may be valuable to both sides and may not be defined to the
letter. However, the relationship may be fairly easily broken, particularly
before tenure has been granted. Though belonging to a faculty-separate
from the employment aspects-may be important to some faculty members
and may tend to bind the faculty member to the institution, a feeling of
belonging may not be a key component of the underlying relationship. When
analogized to citizenship, citizenship of this type would reflect a rights-based
citizenship that exists largely for the convenience of the citizen and the state.
2. Club Membership
Club membership tends to be voluntary, though membership in some
clubs may be hereditary or may be a perquisite of the member's job or
position. Nonetheless, club membership often will to be unrelated to
employment and may be less important to one's livelihood than
employment-based faculty membership. The voluntary nature of the
association with a club and the usual need to seek club membership before it
is offered may suggest that club membership is belonging-based from the
member's perspective. 16 Of course, if the club requires an application and
acceptance by a significant portion of the club or its leadership, membership
may also be belonging-based membership from the membership's
perspective. Belonging-based club membership may trigger fuzzy
obligations in addition to well-defined obligations of club membership.
Fuzzy obligations may include the duties to participate in the life of the club
and to seek new club members who may then become a part of the club's
lifeblood. Well-defined rights of voting and obligations to pay dues may
accompany club membership. However, these rights and obligations may be

15. See SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 6 ("University departments, for instance, routinely
speak of some of their members as good citizens, by which they mean that they do their share
of chores such as sitting on dull committees, teaching elementary courses, and attending
meetings rather than just doing what is often called 'their own work."').
16. For an interesting discussion of club membership in the context of deciding whether
a club is private for discrimination purposes, see Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club,
Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1983).
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seen as insignificant in comparison to the less well-defined benefits that
attend membership.
Club membership can be analogized to citizenship that stems from a
desire to belong to a particular group. The desire to belong may be based
merely on the tangible benefits that may flow from citizenship or from the
desire to join a group of like-minded people. The process of joining a club
can be likened to the naturalization process. However, it is unclear that the
substance of American citizenship-once gained-should be likened to club
membership.
3. Church Membership
Church membership may often begin as involuntary, with the faith of
parents becoming the faith of children until those children can make
independent decisions. 17 Once children become adults, church membership
arguably becomes voluntary. Even so, the inertial pull of religion may make
church membership less volitional than it appears. Indeed, the belief that
one's religious views have not changed much over time might be sufficient
to retain the church membership of one's youth without much thought.
However, church membership may also be based on belief and affinity.
Consequently, it may be primarily about belonging in a meaningful sense.
The belonging may not be based on acceptance by the group to which the
parishioner adheres. Rather, it ritay be based on the intellectual decision to
associate oneself with a particular doctrine or belief system that manifests
itself in the church. 18
The rights and obligations that surround church membership can be quite
fuzzy. Certainly, a general but often undefined obligation to support one's
church may exist as may an obligation to participate in the life of the church.
The obligations that are owed may not be owed to the other members of the
church at all, but only to God, the church or the religion itself. There also
may be few, if any, rights to exercise.

17. A lack of consent does not necessarily excuse a member from obligations . .See
BREWER, supra note 2, at 5 ("As I stated, the mere fact of relationship carries obligations, and
it matters not whether that relationship is one voluntarily entered into, or one in which we are
placed without our consent.").
18. For a discussion of issues relating to the desire to associate or disassociate from
beliefs regarding church doctrine, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr. & Isaac A. McBeth, Much Ado
About Nothing Much: Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Virginia v. Truro
Church, 45 U. RICH. L. REv. 141 (2010).
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Considering citizenship through the lens of church membership may be
illuminating. It may evoke a citizenship that is particularly participatory. It
suggests the possibility that citizenship can be volitional and can trigger
generalized obligations that are not tied explicitly to rights but rather to
beliefs. That suggests a citizenship of belonging that focuses on the
individual's desire to affiliate with the American polity rather than focusing
on the American polity's willingness to accept the citizen. This vision of
citizenship might be analogized to birthright or naturalized citizens who have
fully contemplated why they wish to be or remain American citizens.
4. Family Membership
Family membership is arguably the most complex type of membership of
those mentioned. It is often based purely on birth and is usually involuntary
rather than volitional. Exit from the family is possible as a mental or
emotional matter and may be possible as a legal matter. 19 However, exit is
not possible as a matter of biology. Few rights of membership may come
from family membership, though legal rights and obligations may attend
certain familial relationships and circumstances. 20 Similarly, few clear
obligations may flow from family membership, though there may be fuzzy
obligations such as an obligation of loyalty to other family members.
Regardless of how a person fulfills familial obligations, and even if the
person seeks to "leave" the family, the person may always be considered
"one of us."
Of course, there are other non-birthright types of family membership,
such as membership by marriage or by adoption. Membership by marriage is
voluntary. Family membership by marriage triggers unclear rights and
obligations. Of course, questions of acceptance and belonging do exist, and
exit is possible. Family membership by adoption requires the acceptance of
the subject based on the decision of the elders of the family. In the case of
young children, there may be no formal acceptance of the membership. Once
the adoption decision is made, membership by adoption becomes largely like
19. However, exit from the family through divorce often does not end obligations to
other family members. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations
and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303 ( 1994) (generally discussing obligations in the
shadow of divorce). Indeed, exit from the family may be much more likely to occur when the
family is dissolved rather than when a member exits the family.
20. Illness may create certain obligations and death may create certain rights or
responsibilities. Indeed, the law may honor some of those obligations. See Family Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 260 I, et seq. (providing unpaid leave for employee to tend to
certain familial emergencies, including illness).
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birthright family membership. Exit is possible based on emotional ties or by
the breaking of legal bonds. However, even those breaks may not be
permanent or effective. The adopted child may always be deemed a member
of the family even after explicitly repudiating the family.
Familial membership is most like birthright citizenship. 21 Such
citizenship is not volitional. It simply is. There is no formal acceptance that
must occur and the citizen simply is a citizen. Nonetheless, that form of
citizenship does not necessarily suggest that the citizenship is belongingbased. Indeed, one may argue that the automatic nature of the citizenship
guarantees that the citizen is a citizen even if she does not really belong or
even want to belong in any formal way.
C. Non-Members
The focus so far has been on membership and the relationship that
members have with each other and with the community. However, the status
of nonmembers in a community is important as well. For nonmembers, the
value of membership depends on what rights are exercised exclusively by
members. The content of membership may not depend on whether the
membership is rights-based or belonging-based. Rather, it may depend on
how membership rights are defmed. For example, if a nonmember of a
community is treated just like a member, membership may not matter
much. 22 A family friend who is just like family may be treated as though she
were a member of the family without regard to formal membership in the
family. She may have "rights" similar to other family members. Similar
issues may arise in the context of citizenship. For much of the history of the
United States, citizenship rights and political rights were separate. Being an
adult citizen did not mean that one could vote. 23 In addition, in the early days

21. See BREWER, supra note 2, at 5 ("We are not only born into families but also into
citizenship in a nation, and so long as the relationship springing out of that birth continues
there are obligations resting upon us as citizens which cannot be ignored. These obligations
are the responsibilities of citizenship.").
22. Conversely, it may matter quite a bit. See SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 16 ("The value
of citizenship was derived primarily from its denial to slaves, to some white men, and to all
women.").
23. See id. at 34 (noting that, at times, freedmen were not given the franchise even when
they were citizens of the jurisdiction).
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of the country, some noncitizens could vote. 24 Voting rights were clearly
treated as something other than citizenship rights. 25
In a community where citizenship is rights-based, the rights owed by the
state to the citizen may be fairly minimal and narrowly circumscribed. In that
community, not being a citizen may not matter terribly much because
membership may not provide much benefit. 26 Conversely, in a rights-based
community where citizenship rights are significant, citizenship may matter
very much. The key is whether citizens and noncitizens are treated
differently or treated similarly regarding rights. For example, if nonmembers
are afforded the same rights to vote or run for office as citizens, and are
required to discharge the same obligations to pay taxes or serve in the
military, citizenship and non-citizenship may not appear particularly
different. 27
As with rights-based citizenship, belonging-based citizenship may come
with fairly insignificant rights and obligations or may come with fairly
significant rights and obligations. Whether citizenship tends toward being
belonging-based depends on how important the non-defined aspects of
citizenship are, not merely on how many or how few rights and obligations
attend citizenship. Nonetheless, belonging-based communities may tend to
have fewer rights that accompany citizenship or membership. If the essence
of citizenship is belonging-based and few rights come with citizenship, a
noncitizen may be treated as if he belongs, i.e., as a citizen, even as actual
citizens are treated as if they do not belong.
Membership can take many forms and can be viewed as primarily rightsbased, primarily belonging-based or anything in between. 28 There is no
24. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Dred Scott: Tiered Citizenship and Tiered Personhood,
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 216-17 (2007) (discussing distribution of the vote in early
America).
25. Of course, the extension of rights to non-citizens may not alter the possibility that
the rights provided are fundamentally rights for citizens. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 170 ( 1998) ("Surely the fact that Americans may often extend many benefits of our
Bill [of Rights] to, say resident aliens-for reasons of prudence, principle, or both-does not
alter the basic fact that these rights are paradigmatically rights of and for American citizens.").
26. See PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP 81-82 (2008) (noting that the lack of
rights owed specifically to and duties owed specifically by citizens makes citizenship less
important or less salient to citizens and non-citizens alike).
27. See id. at 82 (noting that the obligations and rights of citizens and non-citizens are
almost precisely the same although that has not historically been the case).
28. See BREWER, supra note 2, at 3 ("Out of all the relations into which human beings
enter, or are brought, there spring obligations--obligations resting upon each party to the
relationship, yet varying in the specific duties imposed with the character of the relationship
and the place each occupies therein.").
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clearly correct view of the nature of membership and citizenship. As
importantly, different citizens may view citizenship differently. Nonetheless,
citizenship of a particular type may tend to create societies that are more or
less cohesive or are more or less able to live up to their ideals of civic virtue.
III. CITIZENSHIP UNTIL THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS

A. Founding Era Principles

The Founding Era did not provide a definitive description of citizenship
that necessarily tilted toward being either rights-based or belonging-based. 29
Many of the discussions of citizenship that punctuated the Founding Era
hearken back to a classical vision of citizenship. That vision of citizenship
suggests that a good citizen is somewhat selfless and works for the common
good. 30 That may tend toward a belonging-based citizenship that focuses on
civic virtue. Indeed, the Founding Era references to classical citizenship may
be thought to suggest that many Founders wished for a belonging-based
citizenship in which moral ties bound the citizen to the new country more
tightly than laws and statutes.
However, the Founders recognized that man in his normal state may tend
toward a selfishness that is inconsistent with sustained civic virtue. 31 The
classical vision of the citizen being created or molded by the state-an
assumption of an Aristotelian view of citizenship-did not fit comfortably

29. It may have been enough for the Founders to focus on the concept of equal
citizenship for those who were granted citizenship. See JAMES H. KElTNER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 10 (1978) ("The Revolution created
the status of 'American citizen' and produced an expression of the general principles that
ought to govern membership in a free society: republican citizenship ought to rest on consent;
it ought to be uniform and without invidious gradations; and it ought to confer equal rights.");
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 232 (1991) ("Equality
was in fact the most radical and most powerful ideological force let loose in the Revolution.").
30. See Robert A. Dahl, Is Civic Virtue a Relevant Ideal in a Pluralistic Society, in
DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP 2 (1996) (describing civic virtue as animating various political
traditions, including the American political tradition through the American Revolution and
beyond); RICHARD C. SINOPOLI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 6 (1992)
("Leaving the differences aside for the moment, I suggest that both Federalists and antiFederalists were concerned with the problem of fostering a sentiment of allegiance from
which a disposition to undertake civic duties would emerge.").
31. See SINOPOLI, supra note 30, at 159 ("It is worth remembering that the authors of
The Federalist considered the active patriotism of the revolutionary era to be the result of a
'temporary ardor,' not long sustainable in periods of normal politics.").
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with a Revolution-era vision of a citizenry that creates the state. 32 That may
suggest that the bonds between the state and citizen may only be as strong as
can be enforced by the state. 33 In addition, there was reason to believe that a
classical vision of citizenship was not attainable in a country the size of the
United States. 34 All of this may suggest a practical notion of citizenship that
is more rights-based than belonging-based. However, rather than focus
directly on whether citizenship was rights-based or belonging-based, the
Founders arguably focused more on providing that whatever citizenship was
provided would be provided equally. 35 As will be seen below, equal
citizenship may not necessarily tilt toward either being rights-based or
belonging-based citizenship.
B. The Antebellum Constitution

American citizenship did not exist before the Constitution was written,
though there may have been a distinctly American outlook that united many
of the inhabitants of the several colonies. 36 The Declaration of Independence
did not create an American citizenry; it united the colonies for purposes of
war, not nationhood. State citizenship existed in the wake of independence.
Indeed, state constitutions governed and defined the relationship between the
state and its citizens and inhabitants. Even though the Articles of
32. This is contested ground. See Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn & Susan Dunn, Introduction,
in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP x (1996) ("There has always been an important strand in the
liberal political tradition that has resisted the idea that membership in the political community
requires the subordination of one's own interests to those of others.").
33. However, the citizen's attachment to the republic may not be static. See Pickus,
supra note 7, at 64 ("For Publius [of the Federalist Papers], American citizenship meant
attachment to a common identity that is itself subject to change. He tried to forge a shared
identity without foreclosing deliberation over the nature of that identity.").
34. See Dahl, supra note 30, at 2-4 (suggesting that the primacy of civic virtue does not
work with a large, diverse republic that does not agree of the precise content of the public
good).
.
35. Of course, even for some of the most equality-minded Founders, none of this
discussion included free blacks. See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE
AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 133 (2d ed. 2001).
Because Jefferson could not imagine living in a society in which blacks could claim
equal rights, he could never comfortably consider emancipation or manumission ....
Because Jefferson believed free blacks could never be citizens--despite the fact that
they were citizens in the states immediately north and south of Virginia-he assumed
they would become an exploited and ungovernable mob.
!d.
36. See WOOD, supra note 29, at 8 (1991) (discussing the American Revolution and
implementation of an American vision of culture and society).
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Confederation created a United States, it did not create the United States in a
way that created American citizenship. 37 Until the Constitution was drafted,
there was no need to contemplate the content of American citizenship
because American citizenship did not exist. Given that state citizenship
clearly predated national citizenship, the question is not whether American
citizenship came before state citizenship, but when it eclipsed state
citizenship in relevance and what were its essential features. 38
Citizenship became a national issue when the Constitution created a
nation and transferred the right to make new United States citizens to
Congress through its control over naturalization. 39 The Constitution may
reflect the nature of American citizenship. 40 However, it did not provide a
specific content of American citizenship. 41 Though the Constitution said little
about the content of citizenship, it required that citizens be treated equally by
the states. That may not illuminate the content of American citizenship, but it
suggested that American citizens must be treated with a reasonable level of
decency everywhere in the country.
Though the Constitution has little to say about the content of citizenship,
it mentions citizenship a number of times. The text of the antebellum
Constitution did not provide definitive evidence that American citizenship
should be viewed as rights-based or belonging-based. It arguably is a legal
document that simply provides rights, and says nothing about the nature of
37. See WISE, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that under the Articles of Confederation "while
State citizenship necessarily followed at once to the inhabitants of the colonies, respectively,
upon the acknowledgement of their independence, no citizenship of the United States was
recognized or even existed.").
38. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 166--67 (1875) (noting that state citizenship
predated U.S. citizenship); see also GETIYS, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that, since the
Fourteenth Amendment, national citizenship is "paramount and dominant" to state
citizenship). Interestingly, other types of citizenship also predated national citizenship. See
WISE, supra note 2, at 13-17 (discussing the citizenship of the Northwest Territory, which
predated national citizenship).
39. See WISE, supra note 2, at 17 ("When the Constitution was ratified by nine of the
States composing the old confederacy, and not until then, was there an actual and real
citizenship of the United States, however much the term may have been theretofore loosely
employed.").
40. See SPIRO, supra note 26, at 4 ("Before one asks what it means to be an American,
one must ask who is an American. Unlike other treatments of American national character, it
takes the legal status of citizenship as a mirror of the community. In this view, nothing is more
constitutive of the community than its membership practices.").
41. See LOUELLA GETIYS, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1934)
("When the United States Constitution was adopted, it contained no definition of citizenship
although it made use of the term 'citizens.' Furthermore, it recognized not only citizens of
each state but also citizens of the United States.").
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citizenship. Nonetheless, the Constitution-like any document-may reflect
certain principles that are not explicitly stated in it. However, the
Constitution does not speak definitively about its orientation on citizenship.
The Constitution's equality-based text could support either a rights-based or
a belonging-based citizenship.
I. Naturalization
Citizens of the several states also became citizens of the United States
when the Constitution became operative. However, once passed, the
Constitution granted Congress the sole power to determine who can become
a U.S. citizen. 42 That text merely provides that non-citizens can become
citizens on whatever terms Congress decides. It does not provide much
reason to believe that citizenship is necessarily belonging-based or
necessarily rights-based. Congress may structure the naturalization process
so that the only people who are accepted as citizens are those who
"belong."43 However, providing the power to Congress to do so does not
necessarily mean that citizenship is belonging-based or rights-based.
2. Privileges and Immunities Clause
The Constitution's Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause suggests
that states are ordinarily supposed to treat citizens of sister states the same as
their own citizens. 44 This might appear to suggest that American citizenship
is inclusive. However, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was borrowed
in substance from the Articles of Confederation. 45 Consequently, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause arguably is focused more on how states
ought to treat free people rather than on the substance of national citizenship.
42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To establish an
uniform rule of Naturalization.").
43. See Gabriel J. Chin, Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President: Eleven
Months And A Hundred Yards Short Of Citizenship, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS I
(2008) (discussing the history of United States naturalization law).
44. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2. The Constitution also has a privileges or immunities
clause embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I. However,
that clause does not create rights. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 170 (1875) ("The
Constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens. For that definition we
must look elsewhere."). It provides another protection for rights that already exist. See AMAR,
supra note 25, at 182.
45. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV ("[T)he free inhabitants of each
of these states ... shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several states[.]").
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Nonetheless, continuing a tradition of the equal treatment of sister state
citizens and transforming that necessarily into the equal treatment of U.S.
citizens from sister states, may provide some hint regarding the substance of
U.S. citizenship. The requirement that states treat all U.S. citizens as they
treat their own when regulating sister-state citizens might be thought to
suggest a belonging-based citizenship. Conversely, that states had to be
required by constitutional text to treat sister state citizens like their own
citizens may suggest that being an American citizen does not necessarily
mean that the citizen will be treated as belonging to the polity by individual
states. That might suggest a rights-based citizenship.
3. Citizenship Requirements for Holding Office
There are various citizenship requirements for holding specific federal
offices. 46 United States Representatives must be citizens for seven years
before serving. 47 United States Senators must be citizens for nine years
before serving. 48 The president must be a natural born citizen. 49 The various
limitations on which citizens can hold certain offices suggest a particular
vision of belonging. By dividing some citizens from others with respect to
who can hold office, the Constitution seems to suggest that mere citizenship
may not suggest full belonging. Indeed, the requirement that the president be
a natural born citizen suggests that there will always be some limits on the
nature of belonging for those who do not enjoy birthright citizenship. Using
the circumstances of one's birth as a qualification suggests a somewhat
intriguing way of determining fidelity to the United States. Put differently,
there may always be a bit of doubt about whether a foreign-born U.S. citizen
is sufficiently American to be trusted to run the country. The limitations on
holding certain federal offices arguably suggest that citizenship may not only
be belonging-based, but that the belonging must be of a certain type.
4. Diversity Jurisdiction
The Constitution mentions citizenship with respect to the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. The federal courts have jurisdiction over various matters

46. Some have argued that holding office is a citizenship right. See Chambers, supra
note 24, at 215 n.27.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2.
48. U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 3.
49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1;. Chin, supra note 43, at 5-14 (discussing natural-born
citizenship)
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in which the citizen-parties are from different states. 50 Without federal
jurisdiction, a state court would have jurisdiction over a matter in which it
could presumably favor its home state litigant. However, as with the
privileges and immunities clause, the existence of diversity jurisdiction says
more about concerns regarding how states treat citizens from fellow states
than it does about the substance of American citizenship.

C. Dred Scott v. Sandford, American Citizenship and Black Citizenship
Dred Scott v. Sandfor~ 1 defined and denied African American
citizenship before the Civil War. 52 The questions surrounding free blacks and
the American polity revolved around citizenship, membership and inclusion.
Dred Scott conflated them and rejected all of them for free blacks. Dred
Scott made clear that African American citizenship was non-existent. 53 Not
only did Chief Justice Taney make clear in that opinion that free blacks were
not citizens, he argued that free blacks were ill-suited to citizenship in
general and American citizenship in particular. 54 Taney stated that free
blacks and slaves could only become American citizens through
naturalization processes that had not and likely never would materialize. The
Dred Scott Court;s position was simple: Free blacks were not and could not
be a part of the polity absent specific action affirming their citizenship. 55
Dred Scott arguably supports both a belonging-based and a rights-based
vision of citizenship. Taney suggested that citizenship is about belonging and
being accepted as a member of the American citizenry by the American
citizenry. 56 The Chief Justice explained that Indians and Europeans could
become American citizens through naturalization and become part of the
"us" that constituted the American citizenry by giving up their prior political
50. See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2.
51. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
52. However, the question regarding the citizenship status of free blacks did not first
arise in the I 850s. See Randall Kennedy, Dred Scott and African American Citizenship, in
DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP I 05-06 (1996) (noting the unresolved controversy accompanying
the Missouri Compromise regarding whether free blacks were citizens of the United States);
Maier, supra note 3, at 56 ("The question soon arose whether the freed blacks were citizens of
the United States. It was not readily answered; indeed, that issue prompted the attorney
general's expression of puzzlement in 1862, and was only definitively resolved in 1868 with
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
53. For a discussion of Dred Scott of particular relevance to this essay, see Chambers,
Dred Scott, supra note 24.
54. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 409.
55. /d.
56. /d. at 407.
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and tribal commitments and aligning themselves with the American people. 57
Conversely, the Court suggested that blacks could never belong to the
American polity in the way that a citizen needs to belong to the American
polity. 58 However, the Dred Scott Court relied on a rights-and-obligationsbased vision of citizenship to explain why free blacks had never been
considered citizens. Taney relied on rights ostensibly never given to blacks
(such as the right to vote) and duties ostensibly never owed by blacks to the
state (such as the obligation to bear arms to defend the state) to explain why
blacks had never been a part of the citizenry. 59 Taney did not adequately
explain how his rights-based vision of citizenship meshed with the facts that
some non-citizens voted and some defended the United States by bearing
arms. 60 Nonetheless, Taney focused much of his citizenship argument on
rights and obligations. 61
Taney had no need to determine the nature of American citizenship when
rejecting African American citizenship. Nonetheless, Taney provided a
glimpse of his thoughts on American citizenship and slavery. As importantly,
he provided justification and precedent for treating claims of African
American citizenship as rudely and as narrowly as possible. The Dred Scott
Court created a special outsider status for free blacks in the midst of a society
governed by a Constitution that arguably suggests that free native-born
people, e.g., American Indians, should be treated tolerably well, and possibly
as citizens. The issue post-Dred Scott became whether the treatment of free
blacks would change in the wake of the Civil War to square the group's
treatment with the notions of freedom and liberty arguably extant in the
Constitution.

57. /d. at 403-04.
58. See Chambers, Dred Scott, supra note 24, at 213.
59. Seeid. at215-17.
60. See SPIRO, supra note 26, at 92 (noting that even participation in political life is not
and has not always been fully restricted by citizenship status, though noting that much alien
voting was based on a precitizenship status that was based on declared intention to become a
citizen).
61. Taney's structure could not easily explain women's citizenship. Women were
citizens and were clearly part of the body of American citizens. They belonged. However, the
Court noted that women neither exercised all of the rights of citizenship nor owed all of the
duties to the state that male citizens owed. Thus, women were citizens, even without receiving
some of the rights male citizens were owed and without discharging some of the obligations
that male citizens owed as citizens. Taney simply asserted that women's citizenship was a
·
fact. See Chambers, Dred Scott, supra note 24, at 216.
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D. Civil War, Slavery and African American Citizenship
In the immediate post-Civil War period, the discussion of African
American citizenship became particularly prominent. 62 For many in power,
the issue was not whether African American citizenship was to exist, but
how. The outlawing of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment was, for some,
all that was required to create African American citizenship. Slavery's end
created a large group of free people born in the United States who could
become citizens. Their freedom alone should have been enough to make
them citizens, according to some. 63 ·Others believed that the abolition of
slavery merely created additional free blacks. Assuming that the Dred Scott
Court's denial of citizenship to free blacks was not essentially reversed by
the Civil War, the Thirteenth Amendment did not automatically make free
blacks and newly freed slaves citizens. Indeed, many Southern states
indicated that the regulation of long-free blacks and newly-freed slaves
would continue in the form of newly passed Black Codes. The nature of
those codes made clear that many would not accept free blacks as citizens. 64
However, the Black Codes helped trigger the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.65 That law commanded what the Thirteenth Amendment did not,
that former slaves born in the United States were citizens of the United
States. 66 In addition to providing citizenship, the law cataloged a number of
contract-based and property-based rights clearly deemed incident to
citizenship. 67
62. For a thorough discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment see Douglas L. Colbert,
Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I (1995); Jacobus
tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39 CALIF. L. REV.
171 (1951).
63. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51
EMORY L.J. 1397, 1401 (2002).
64. See JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF SLAVERY 5 (2006) (arguing that the
institution of black codes suggested that "Southern whites could not easily view blacks in
fundamentally new ways" after the Civil War).
65. /d. at 5-6.
66. See JAMES H. KElTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870,
at 341 (1978) (noting that the 1866 Civil Rights Act was "based explicitly upon the principle
that citizenship derived from birth within the allegiance and entitled persons enjoying the
status to basic rights throughout the nation.").
67. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, §I, I 4 Stat. 27 ( 1866).
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power ... shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
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Neither the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment nor the 1866 Civil
Rights Act proves that African American citizenship was specifically rightsbased or specifically belonging-based in the immediate aftermath of the Civil
War. The Thirteenth Amendment's passage arguably suggests that
citizenship is belonging-based. Many who worked to pass the Thirteenth
Amendment appeared to assume that the end of slavery would herald the
beginning of African American citizenship without any specific edict.
Simply, all Americans would do the right thing, accept former slaves and
free blacks as citizens and move on. The attempt to have African Americans
treated as citizens without a specific edict telling other citizens to do so,
certainly may suggest that those who pressed for the Thirteenth Amendment
believed that American citizenship is belonging-based, i.e., that American
citizenship is about being "one of us."
However, the 1866 Act's need to assert explicitly the citizenship of
former slaves in the wake of the refusal of some to accept it may suggest that
American citizenship is not necessarily belonging-based. The Act's specific
provision of the right of African American citizens to be treated as the equal
of white citizens does not prove that American citizenship was rights-based.
Rather, it suggests that in the wake of the passage of the Black Codes,
African American citizenship needed some explicit protection, at least in the
short run. However, the need to protect rights that would seem to flow
clearly and directly from citizenship may suggest that African Amencan
citizenship will be treated as rights-based even if the nature of American
citizenship is belonging-based.
IV. AFRICAN AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN THEW AKE OF THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS

By setting free blacks apart as a group that could never belong to the
American polity, Dred Scott guaranteed that free blacks and those acting in
their interest would have to fight for African American citizenship and
citizenship rights. 68 The Fourteenth Amendment superseded the 1866 Civil
Rights Act and granted citizenship to all native-born black Americans,
making African American citizenship a part of the Constitution. 69 The
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens[.]
!d.
68. See Glazer, supra note 8, at 97 (noting that native black Americans have been
treated noninclusively more than other minority groups).
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Amendment also guaranteed equal citizenship. 70 The Fifteenth Amendment
followed a few years later, barring the provision of the franchise based on
race and formally making African Americans men full voting members of
American society. 71 In whole, the Reconstruction Amendments-the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments-guaranteed that free
blacks were to be full members of the American Republic and would be
treated as such by the individual states. 72 The amendments gave real life to
the basic promises of freedom and equality found in the Constitution, but that
had been obscured by the interpretation of other language in the Constitution.
Indeed, to some, the amendments merely recognized rights that should have
already existed. 73
The amendments did not define what being a citizen meant, could not
guarantee that blacks would be accepted as citizens-members of the republic,
and could not ensure that African American citizenship would be belongingbased.74 Indeed, that the newest native-born Americans had to have their
citizenship confirmed explicitly by amendment may suggest that such
citizenship was grudgingly acknowledged by some and was not in the nature
of belonging. As a result, African American citizenship arguably was rightsbased in that such citizenship would extend only so far as the Constitution
specifically allowed. Indeed, how the rights of citizenship have been

70. See Garrett Epps, Second Founding: The Story of the Fourteenth Amendment, 85
OR. L. REv. 895, 905-06 (2006).
What are the radical ideas that underlie the Fourteenth Amendment? ... Each citizen
is seen as an independent and equal economic and political actor, and government is
to be available and responsive to each of them equally. In this phrase, too, is captured
the idea that membership in American society is not tribal. ... There are no legal
ranks among the people of such a republic.
!d.
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
72. The Reconstruction Amendments did not fully resolve the issue of the full equality
for all citizens, as different groups of citizens had different sets of rights for many years after
the Civil War. For example, restrictions on voting based on sex were lawful until the
Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
73. See Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of
the Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REv. 777, 790 (2008) ("Like many radical Republicans in
other states, Louisiana activists viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as recognition of a set of
claims to citizenship that had always been legitimate, not simply as the conferring of
citizenship on men and women of color at the moment of ratification.").
74. See BOSNIAK, supra note 4, at 85 (noting a minimalist reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment that guarantees citizenship to some but says little if anything about the content of
citizenship).
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structured and how African Americans have been treated in the wake of the
Reconstruction Amendments arguably confirms that.
A. Efforts to Belong
The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment was a significant step in fully
integrating African Americans into the American polity. The process has
75
been a struggle. Certainly, there have been successes. However, law has
been used to stop the full inclusion of African Americans in all areas of the
national community as well as to foster that inclusion. That law had to be
used to force inclusion may suggest that fellow citizens viewed African
American citizenship formally, as rights-based rather than belonging-based.
Plessy v. Ferguson 16 is an important case in understanding the structure
of citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. At issue in Plessy was a
Louisiana law that required that different races sit in separate rail cars while
traveling. Homer Plessy challenged the constitutionality of the law, and lost.
Though the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed that all citizens would enjoy
the same citizenship rights, the Court took a narrow approach in defining
citizenship rights and evaluating their content. Rather than provide a right to
equal dignity in public accommodations, the Court conceptualized the right
claimed as a social right to sit next to white Americans or to ride in a rail car
reserved for white Americans. 77 In defming the claimed right as it did and
rejecting it, the Plessy Court suggested that African Americans, and by
extension all Americans, had certain narrow rights triggered by the
Constitution, but no more. In addition, the substance of Plessy suggested that
the Fourteenth Amendment and citizenship were not necessarily about
belonging to the community as a whole.
Brown v. Board of Education 18 essentially overruled Plessy. Brown may
be thought to be quintessentially about belonging. It could have been, but
75. It is possible that gaining citizenship rights is always a struggle. See SHKLAR, supra
note 2, at 15.
Because exclusion was so much more common and so much easier than
inclusiveness, citizenship was, moreover, always something that required prolonged
struggle, and this also has molded its character. Citizenship so gained lost much of its
urgency once it was attained. The years of denial have left their paradoxical marks
upon this constitutional right.
!d.
76. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
77. See Scott, Public Rights, supra note 73, at 800 (noting that Plessy focuses on the
enforcement of dignitary rights rather than a claim of "social equality").
78. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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arguably was not. The Supreme Court's position was that separate but equal
was inherently unequal. 79 However, that merely proved that the government
failed in its requirement to provide equality with respect to a good that it
provided. The essence of Brown was not necessarily that segregation was
wrong because the races were separated. Though Brown could be interpreted
to make the point that citizens should not be separated based on race, the
decision was based on the specific harm that was caused by the separation
(suggesting a rights-based remedy) rather than from the fact of the separation
(suggesting a belonging-based remedy). 80
In one of the Supreme Court's recent school desegregation cases,
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 81 school
districts were required to litigate an attempt to make sure that their schools
were reasonably diverse. In that case, two school districts were admonished
to stop attempts to racially balance schools using race. 82 Regardless of one's
vision of the rightness or wrongness of the outcome, the vision of citizenship
evidenced in the case appears rights-based. The right vindicated was the right
to avoid racial classification, even if that racial classification was arguably
necessary to ensure a certain level of racial diversity among a student body.
That is, inclusion was deemed secondary to the right not to be racially
classified. The nature of that vision of citizenship is not one of a citizenship
that necessarily encourages or creates strong bonds among the citizen, all of
her fellow citizens and the state. The vision of citizenship suggested in
Parents Involved arguably is one that views the citizen as an individual with
well-defined rights to be asserted and honored, even possibly to the
detriment of the goals of the community in which the citizen lives.
The point of mentioning these cases is not to suggest that the Court
wrongly or rightly decided any of them. That would require far more
nuanced and lengthy analysis of the cases. Rather, it is to suggest that there
may be little evidence that citizenship consists of anything other than the
rights that can be gleaned directly from the Constitution. That is the essence
of a rights-based citizenship. The cases could have been about community
and belonging, but they are not. They are about rights and precisely how
those rights will be interpreted and enforced. That lack of consideration
regarding the community as a whole suggests a citizenship that may be
marked more by rights and obligations than by belonging.
79. !d. at 495.
80. !d. at 492 (noting that the key to the case is the effect of segregation on public
education).
81. 551 U.S. 70 I (2007).
82. !d. at 747-48.
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B. Voting
Voting was not a citizenship right when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified. However, it has continued to expand to the extent that it can now be
considered a citizenship right. The expansion of the right may suggest the
right is about making sure that everyone belongs, or it may merely relate to
the acceptance that equal citizenship requires equal voting rights.
Nonetheless, the need to fight for voting rights suggests a tilt toward a rightsbased citizenship rather than a belonging-based citizenship.
Protection for the right to vote began with the Fourteenth Amendment
and continues in various forms today. Section two of the Fourteenth
Amendment was an attempt to protect against race-based disfranchisement. 83
The section provided a penalty of the loss of representation for states that
disfranchised voters based on race. 84 That could be seen as an attempt to
encourage states to welcome African American citizens as voters and full
participants in the polity. However, that attempt was preempted when the
Fifteenth Amendment banned the use of race in providing the right to vote.
The Fifteenth Amendment provides a right for male former slaves to vote on
the same grounds as other male citizens. 85 The protection was welcomed and
necessary. However, even with the Fifteenth Amendment, the practical
disfranchisement of African American citizens continued for nearly a
century. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed to implement the
Fifteenth Amendment fully. 86 The Act has provided actual protection for the
right to vote since its passage.
The protection of the right to vote of African Americans dovetails with
the continued expansion of the right to vote through the Twentieth Century.
The Constitution has been amended through the years to eliminate
restrictions on the right to vote. Through the Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and
Twenty-sixth Amendments, the Constitution has become a backdoor
guarantee of voting rights to citizens. 87 Voting has become the quintessential
right of citizenship. However, voting has not necessarily shaped the nature of

83. For a discussion of section two of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chambers,
Colorblindness, supra note 63, at 1417-18.
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §2.
85. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, et seq. (2012).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; U.S. CONST. amend.
XXVI.
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citizenship. 88 A citizen is allowed to vote whether or not citizenship is based
on belonging. As voting becomes a citizenship right that is provided to all
citizens absent justification and is denied to noncitizens, it merely marks the
content of the citizenship right-what the state must provide to the citizen. It
does not indicate that the citizen necessarily is an integral part of the
community. Indeed, when groups of citizens must fight for the right to vote,
it is possible that voting has become a mere citizenship right that all can
exercise rather than proof that the citizen belongs to the community in which
he votes.
C. The Nature of African American Citizenship

The Reconstruction Amendments repudiated Dred Scott regarding the
citizenship of free blacks. The Thirteenth Amendment arguably hinted at an
inclusive citizenship with the abolition of slavery. The Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed citizenship to free blacks. The Fifteenth Amendment
provided a stronger form of citizenship-based rights for male former slaves.
However, the issue of inclusion may yet remain separate from the issue of
citizenship. Indeed, citizenship may be defined through the Reconstruction
Amendments merely as a set of rights and obligations owed to citizens by the
country. If citizenship means no more than that, the notion of citizenship as
belonging may have been lost-if it ever existed-in part as a direct result of
how citizenship was addressed in the years surrounding the Civil War.
In the wake of the Fourteenth Amendment, free blacks were made
citizens. However, that citizenship may have been and may be formal and
rights-based. It is unclear that the fact of African American citizenship
means that all citizens are treated as if they belong in the polity. When
citizenship is more about belonging, the formal rights and obligations fade
and the informal ones come to the fore. Little reason exists to believe that
post-Fourteenth Amendment citizenship is belonging-based. There is a
difference between being a citizen and being one of us. The issue is not the
substance of citizenship rights, it is whether the relationship between the
citizen and the nation is structured as rights-based or belonging-based. The
Reconstruction Amendments formally clarified the issues, but arguably did
88. However, it is possible that the expansion itself changes the nature of the Founders'
democracy even if it does not tell us precisely how. See SINPOLI, supra note 30, at 170
("Moreover, each time we have expanded the electorate by including previously excluded
groups, such as blacks and women, we have effectively suggested that a liberal-democratic
system can tolerate a larger, more diverse civic body than either Madison and Hamilton
thought possible.").
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not resolve the deeper question of whether citizenship made free blacks a
true part of the citizenry, rather than merely recognized free blacks as a
segment of the citizenry.
In the wake of the Reconstruction Amendments, African American
citizens have had to fight for basic citizenship rights. Unfortunately,
resistance to the existence of African American citizenship stemming from
racialized slavery of the type endorsed in Dred Scott guaranteed that
claiming African American citizenship would be a process of demanding
rights rather than accepting the benefits of citizenship that all citizens are
thought to enjoy. Dred Scott provided the need to base African American
citizenship on the Constitution's text. However, the Constitution is a legal
document. A resort to a legal document to find the substance of a right may
be problematic because the process of finding the right can lead directly to a
rights-based citizenship. Of course, if the process of finding the content of
citizenship requires a close reading of a legal document to find specific
support for a claim to a right, the process is likely to lead to a rights-based
citizenship. However, if the point of grounding rights in text is to search for
general principles to use to extrapolate general citizenship rights or rights
flowing from belonging, a text-based hunt for the content of citizenship is
not necessarily destined to produce a rights-based citizenship.
The need to ground African American citizenship on constitutional text
was understandable both because Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott opinion
suggested that blacks could never be accepted as citizens and because the
precise contours of American citizenship rights were unclear. However,
basing African American citizenship rights on text had an additional effect. It
guaranteed that African Americans and other Americans were going to need
to fight for equal citizenship rights, right by right. If the Constitution's text
does not indicate that the citizen enjoys a particular right, then no such right
exists. That approach almost guarantees that African American citizenship
would be viewed as a less robust rights-based citizenship rather than as a
more robust belonging-based citizenship. 89 Simply, Dred Scott and its
treatment of free blacks tended to move us toward rights-based citizenship,
rather than belonging-based citizenship.

89. The nature of American citizenship appears to be changing, though almost certainly
not based on a single cause. See SPIRO, supra note 26, at 6 ("The rights and obligations
attendant to citizenship have also attenuated over the course of American history. Citizenship
both demands and privileges less than it once did. The declining legal significance of the
status betrays and reinforces the waning intensity of bonds among members.").

512

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:487

V. CONCLUSION

Since the Founding, Americans have tried to develop principles that
would lead us to a more perfect union. 90 In theory, citizenship is the
foundation on which that attempt rests. However, the nature of American
citizenship was not clear at the Founding and remains somewhat unclear.
Whether American citizenship is supposed to be rights-based with a focus on
the rights owed to citizens by the community and obligations owed by
citizens to the community, or belonging-based with a focus on making sure
that every citizen is thoroughly connected to the community through implicit
connections to fellow citizens and the community that augment any formal
rights and obligations that attend citizenship status is not clear. Constitutional
91
developments over the past century and a half have not resolved the issue.
Regardless of how American citizenship is supposed to be conceived, it
appears that the Dred Scott decision has acted as a headwind against moving
toward a belonging-based citizenship by shaping the manner in which
African American citizenship rights are conceived and enforced. The Dred
Scott Court provided language and precedent that structures African
American citizenship as rights-based. The Court essentially guaranteed that
African American citizenship would necessarily have to be created by and
imposed on the country by specific edicts grounded in the text of the
Constitution. In addition, it ensured that African American citizenship would
be narrowly construed and would have to be defended at all turns by pressing
for specific rights. That process was required even in the wake of the
destruction of slavery and the ratification of a Fourteenth Amendment that
promised equal citizenship and an expanded citizenry.
The treatment of citizenship claims by African Americans arguably
reflects a fragile, static, and formal relationship among those citizens and the
polity. If American citizenship in general comes to reflect a fragile, static,
and formal relationship, it may well be because at some point in the past,
Americans were reluctant to view citizenship as belonging-based because
that would have required that the former slaves and free blacks be welcomed
90. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
91. It may be that the rapid expansion of citizenship has altered society in ways that are
difficult to measure merely by reference to citizenship rights. See Douglas Klusmyer,
Introduction, in FROM MIGRANTS To CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP lN A CHANGING WORLD 1 (T.
Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmyer eds., 2000) ("The admission of immigrants with
cultural heritages and historical experiences different from those of their host societies
inevitably changes the fabric of these societies and requires a complex process of mutual
adaptation.").
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into a society that had, up to that point, not viewed them as fundamentally
belonging. That reluctance may have been sufficient to stop American
citizenship from developing into a belonging-based citizenship. However,
that reluctance had significant support from the Court's opinion in Dred
Scott. That opinion almost certainly helped limit the bonds among citizens
and between citizens and the state, and may have led to a weaker republic
than would have existed otherwise. 92 If so, this is just one more legacy that
can be laid at the footsteps of that notorious case.

/

92. It may have had an effect on the drift that has appeared to have occurred. See SPIRO,
supra note 26, at 162.
This perspective confirms the general perception across American society that
America is losing its sense of special social, cultural, and political purpose and that
Americans themselves feel less bonded to each other. Those who describe this drift
invariably look to restore the intensity of the national tie. Call it patriotism on the
right, civic duty on the left-both point in the same direction, toward the formerly
elevated place of the nation among our many forms of association.
/d.

